The Gemara has spent a few pages discussing what forms of intent render an offering piggul, invalid specifically because of an intention to eat it at the wrong time. Taking a step back, today’s daf presents a beraita which derives the concept of piggul as an intent-based prohibition:
The sages taught with regard to the verse, “And if any of the flesh of his peace offerings be at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18) that Rabbi Eliezer said: Bend your ear to hear the true meaning of the verse: The verse is speaking of one who intends to partake of his offering on the third day. Or perhaps it is referring only to one who actually partakes of his offering on the third day? Would you say that after the offering is fit for the first two days, it should then be disqualified retroactively?
A peace offering can only be eaten for the two days after it’s sacrificed. According to the simple meaning of the verse, if someone eats their peace offering on the third day after sacrifice, which is forbidden, the offering is not accepted by God. As Rabbi Eliezer points out, this is a somewhat puzzling conclusion: Do we say that because a person ultimately ate the offering in a forbidden way, the sacrifice that appeared valid three days ago is retroactively no longer acceptable? To avoid such a conclusion, Rabbi Eliezer suggests that the verse refers to one who, while offering the sacrifice, has the intentto eat it on the third day. This prohibited intent during the process of sacrificing then renders the offering immediately disqualified. And this is how we arrive at the definition of piggul.
But not without an argument. One of Rabbi Eliezer’s colleagues points out that retroactive invalidation is perhaps not so problematic:
Rabbi Akiva said to him: Yes. After all, we find with regard to a man who experiences a discharge, or a woman who experiences a discharge after her menstrual period, or a woman who observes a clean day for a day when she experiences a discharge, that they all have the presumptive status of purity after immersing. But once they have seen another discharge the same day, they have negated this status retroactively. Therefore, you should not be surprised about this offering, that even though it was rendered fit, it may later be disqualified.
Rabbi Akiva points out that we do, in fact, have examples in halakhah where a later action retroactively changes the status of something or someone. If a zav (a male who experiences an irregular discharge) or zava (the female equivlalent) is counting seven clean days after their discharge has stopped, and they then experience another emission, those clean days they’ve counted are retroactively annulled. Therefore, we do have precedent for this notion of retroactive disqualification or change in status.
Rabbi Eliezer said to him: But the same verse says: “He who offers it,” indicating that the offering is disqualified at the time of its offering, and it is not disqualified on the third day. Or perhaps when the verse says: “He who offers it,” this is referring only to the priest who sacrifices the offering. But if so, it would have been enough for the verse to state: He who offers shall not be credited. Therefore, when it states instead: “Neither shall it be credited to he who offers it,” this indicates that the verse is speaking of the offering, and it is not speaking of the priest.
Rabbi Eliezer argues that the phrasing of the verse implies the offering is not accepted at the time of its offering. While one might have interpreted the phrasing as coming to teach us about the status of the priest himself, Rabbi Eliezer points out that if this were the case, the verse could have taught us so more simply. Therefore, if we interpret the line to mean that the offering is disqualified in the moment of its offering, it must be referring to improper intent around eating, not actual improper eating that happens much later.
Other unnamed sages offer an alternative derivation of the same rule:
Others say: One can conclude that the verse (Leviticus 7:18) is referring to improper intention rather than improper consumption from the phrase “neither shall it be credited (yechashev),” which indicates that the offering is disqualified by improper intention (machashava), and it is not disqualified by consumption on the third day.
The words “credited” and “intention” share a verbal root — literally, “thought,” — which, to this line of thinking, proves that thought is what disqualifies the sacrifice. Whereas Rabbi Eliezer’s derivation was premised on a logical argument, this one is premised on a linguistic comparison. But both ultimately come to the same conclusion: Despite the seemingly straightforward reading of the verse — that eating flesh on the third day disqualifies the offering — offerings are in fact rendered piggul not by the act of belated consumption, but by the intent to consume them improperly at the time of offering.
Read all of Zevachim 29 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on October 13, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
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