Shevuot 49

On today’s daf, the last in Tractate Shevuot, we read the entirety of its final and tiniest chapter. It is a quintessentially rabbinic discussion of oath taking, a beautifully self-contained microcosm of the tractate as a whole.

The mishnah begins by delineating four arrangements in which one person has possession of property belonging to another:

1. The unpaid caretaker — who volunteers to take care of another’s property

2. The borrower — who makes use of another’s property for free

3. The paid caretaker — who is paid to take care of another’s property

4. The renter — who pays to use another’s property

Two of these (the borrower and the renter) benefit from the arrangement, either because they are paid or because they get to use the property. The other two do not. In two of these arrangement (paid caretaker and renter) money changes hands — but in opposite directions. In the other two, no money changes hands.

What happens when someone in one of these arrangements loses the property they are in possession of and the owner comes to collect? It depends, says the mishnah, on the arrangement:

The unpaid caretaker takes an oath for everything (and pays nothing). 

The borrower pays for everything.

The paid caretaker and a renter are the same: They take an oath concerning an injured animal, and concerning a captured one, and concerning a dead animal (and then do not have to pay). But they must pay if the deposit cannot be returned due to loss or theft.

The unpaid caretaker and the borrower are the clearest cases. The unpaid caretaker entered an arrangement that had no benefit to himself, so he assumes the least burden — he takes an oath and is not obligated to pay for the lost item. In the case of a borrower, the original owner entered an agreement that had no clear benefit, so it is she who assumes the least burden — the borrower has no option to take an oath, and must pay for the missing property.

But the cases of the paid caretaker and renter are different because in those cases both sides benefit from the arrangement. And in those cases, the answer is more complicated — it depends on what exactly happened to the missing property.

The mishnah goes on to address an even more complicated case, in which someone gives a false oath. For instance, perhaps the ox they were guarding was stolen, but they swore it died. The mishnah explores many scenarios to determine liability for this kind of false oath, and then concludes this winding discussion with a general principle:

Anyone who takes an oath to be lenient with himself is liable; if he takes an oath to be stringent with himself, he is exempt.

Sometimes, tractates soar to lyrical conclusions. This one doesn’t. The Gemara picks up the discussion by asking who posited the four types of temporary possession arrangements with which the mishnah began, then asks if in fact three categories make more sense than four, interrogates in the mishnah and rules on which rabbi’s interpretation is correct. Then the tractate stops. So let’s circle back to the principle in the mishnah about oaths. If someone takes a false oath in a way that benefits himself, he is liable. But if he takes a false oath that causes him to assume more responsibility, then he is exempt. And this underlines the primary purpose of oaths — to prevent us from harming others.

The system of oath-taking is a complicated balancing act, one that depends on people to speak honestly but is devised precisely because they don’t always. It’s a system for a highly imperfect world, but one that is not broken beyond repair. As we close the page on this chapter, may we continue to see our world in this way, and continue the holy work of its repair.

Read all of Shevuot 49 on Sefaria.

This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on June 19, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.