Shevuot 30

Equal footing.

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In Tractate Makkot, we frequently had occasion to discuss Deuteronomy 19:16–19, a passage that prescribes a unique punishment for those who testify falsely against others: They suffer the punishment the accused would have experienced if they were found guilty. In that passage, the Torah states: “… the two parties to the dispute shall stand before God …” We might have assumed this should be understood metaphorically, but on today’s daf the rabbis cite a beraita that suggests it is applied literally:

“Then the two parties shall stand” — this indicates that there is a mitzvah for the litigants to stand during the court proceedings. 

Rabbi Yehuda said: I heard that if the judges wished to seat both of the litigants, they may seat them. What, then, is prohibited for the judges? They must ensure that there will not be a situation where one litigant is standing and one litigant is sitting, or a situation where one litigant says everything that he needs to say and the judge says to the other litigant: “Curtail your statement.”

At first, the sages read Deuteronomy literally and declare the Torah obligates litigants to stand during court proceedings. But Rabbi Yehuda has a different take. For him, the two parties are meant to be on an equal physically footing, though not necessarily actually standing. Similarly, just as neither is given a physical advantage, the litigants must both be allotted enough time to present their case to the fullest.
While it appears, at first glance, that Rabbi Yehuda holds a minority opinion, the Gemara cites a second beraita that tenders the same ruling (as a majority opinion), deriving it from a different verse from the Torah: “But in righteousness shall you judge your colleague.” (Leviticus 19:15)

Having mentioned Leviticus 19:15, the Gemara proceeds to cite a second tradition about this verse:

“But in righteousness shall you judge your colleague,” teaches that you should judge another favorably.

Rav Yosef teaches: With regard to one who is with you in Torah and in mitzvot, try to judge him favorably.

Who, exactly, is this colleague (amit, in Hebrew) that is judged in righteousness? We might have supposed it meant any fellow human being, as the anonymous voice here suggests, but Rav Yosef reads the word colleague more narrowly, teaching that judges should reserve this benefit for those who measure up in their Torah observance. This takes us swiftly from an assertion of radical egalitarianism in the court to explicit favoritism — all on the basis of a single word. The Gemara responds to this stunning reversal with a story:

Rav Ulla, son of Rav Ilai, had a trial pending before Rav Nahman. Rav Yosef sent a message to Rav Nahman: Ulla our friend is a colleague in Torah and mitzvot.

Rav Nahman said: For what purpose did he send this message to me? Does he expect me to grant him preferential treatment? Every judgment must be undertaken with righteousness.

Rav Nahman then said: Rav Yosef sent me the message to ensure I would begin with Rav Ulla’s dispute.

Rav Yosef, who taught above that the righteousness of judgment dictated by Leviticus 19:15 applies only to those who are steeped in Torah and mitzvot, advocates for Rav Ulla who meets these standards. Rav Nahman, the judge set to hear Rav Ulla’s case, is initially troubled: Judges must treat all who come before them equally, so how could Rav Yosef ask him to show preference to Rav Ulla? Rav Nahman eventually reasons out the answer: He can give Rav Ulla preference in scheduling and put his case first on the docket. This will convenience Rav Ulla, but won’t bias the outcome of his case. In this way, Rav Nahman squares Rav Yosef’s uncomfortable assertion that those who are more committed to Torah and mitzvot get preference in a court of law.

For Rav Nahman, and apparently for the Gemara, preferential scheduling does not appear to violate the core principle that litigants should be treated equally in court. Maimonides agrees, and also advises scheduling cases involving orphans before those involving widows, who themselves are permitted to precede Torah scholars, whose cases are heard before everyone else.

Read all of Shevuot 30 on Sefaria.

This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on May 31, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.

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