Shevuot 37

On today’s daf, we encounter the following beraita:

In the case of one who robbed another of a field and then a river flooded it, he is liable to provide the owner with a different field — this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer.

And the rabbis say: He can say to the owner: That which is yours is before you.

If one person steals another’s field, and then the field floods, should the thief return that field in its soggy state? Or must the thief hand over a different field equal in value to the original one at the time of theft — before the flooding depreciated its value? Rabbi Eliezer says the latter; his colleagues say the former.

This pair of conclusions is interesting — and you may have an immediate instinct for which answer feels correct — but perhaps more compelling is the reasoning through which each derives their conclusion. The Gemara continues:

With regard to what do they disagree? Rabbi Eliezer interprets Leviticus 5:21–25 according to the hermeneutical principle of ribui umiyut, amplifications and restrictions. The rabbis interpret them according to the hermeneutical principle of klal uprat, generalizations and details.

Ribui umiyut and klal uprat are both rabbinic techniques of biblical interpretation. Both are ways of reading texts that begin by stating a general principle, followed by specific examples of that principle. That is exactly how Leviticus 5:21–25, the source of this debate, is structured:

When a person sins and commits a trespass against God — by dealing deceitfully with another in the matter of a deposit or a pledge, or through robbery, or by defrauding another, or by finding something lost and lying about it; if they swear falsely regarding any one of the various things that a person may do and sin thereby … they shall repay the principal amount and add a fifth part to it.

The general (and potentially extremely broad) statement is: “When a person sins and commits a trespass against God.” The specific examples that follow are more focused. They include stealing a deposit or pledge, lying about finding a stolen object and swearing a false oath of deposit.This is a common rhetorical structure in the Torah. When the rabbis encounter it, there is frequently a concern about how it should be interpreted. Are the specific cases merely examples of the larger principle, which might encompass many more things? Or are they the sum total of what the larger principle entails? In other words: Do those specific examples limit the scope of interpretation? Or do they broaden it?

According to the principle of ribui umiyut, the examples that follow the general rule are just that — examples. The general category may encompass much more, and unless the situation at hand is completely  at odds with the examples, the general rule holds. According to the principle of klal uprat, the opposite is true: The examples are seen as more than just an illustration of the general point; they limit the scope of the generality to things that are similar or even identical to the specific examples. 

Because Rabbi Eliezer looks at the text through the lens of ribui umiyut, he interprets the law as applying to thefts of a wide range of items — which includes land. As a result, the rules on repayment plus a penalty apply to a theft of land. This is why the person who stole a field that flooded must repay with a better field.

The rabbis use klal uprat to reach the opposite conclusion. Under klal uprat, the rule applies only to things similarto the specific examples. As a result, the rule on compensation doesn’t apply to land, so the thief simply has to return what was stolen, even in its now depreciated state.

Given that these interpretive technique apply in similar textual situations, how do we know which one governs? Why did Rabbi Eliezer choose ribui umiyut while his colleagues chose klal uprat? The difference has to do with one’s teachers. In the tannaitic era, there were two great and competing schools of biblical interpretation — one headed by Rabbi Akiva, and one by Rabbi Ishmael. Ribui umiyut is more closely associated with Rabbi Akiva’s school of thought, while klal uprat is embraced by the school of Rabbi Ishmael.

Ultimately, the medieval codes side with the rabbis. But as today’s daf shows, the outcome of textual interpretation may depend on the technique you use more than the underlying text itself. 

Read all of Shevuot 37 on Sefaria.

This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on June 7, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.