Countless thrillers and mysteries feature a reluctant witness — often because they fear the dangerous defendant and their minions. We are in the midst of a discussion of just such a problem: witnesses who refuse to testify. Reserving judgment for those who may have witnessed a gruesome crime and be reluctant to testify, Talmud holds the view that, in monetary disputes, a witness who refuses to testify has transgressed.
The source of this ruling is Leviticus 5:1: “… a person who is able to testify as having either seen or learned of the matter but doesn’t testify is subject to punishment.” Using a gezerah shavah based on the word “or,” the rabbis connect this to accusations of false testimony regarding, “a deposit or a pledge, or through robbery, or by defrauding another, or by finding something lost and lying about it” (Leviticus 5:21) and conclude that both are limited to monetary matters.
But some rabbis offer alternate derivations. Let’s consider one:
Rabbi Yosei HaGelili cites a different proof and says: The verse states with regard to an oath of testimony: “a person who is able to testify as having either seen or learned of the matter…” (Leviticus 5:1). It is with regard to testimony that is founded on sight without knowledge of the matter, or by means of knowledge of the matter without sight that the verse is speaking.
Rabbi Yosei homes in on the word “or,” but for a different reason: He notes that the text speaks of cases where the person eithersaw or knew, but not both. What kinds of situations are we talking about? The Gemara explains:
Sight without knowledge, how so? It is a case where the creditor claims: “I counted 100 dinars for you before so-and-so and so-and-so,” and the debtor responds: “Let so-and-so and so-and-so come and testify.” This is a case of sight without knowledge.
In this scenario, the potential witnesses lack context: They ostensibly watched the plaintiff count out money, but they were unaware that the money being counted was for a loan — perhaps they assumed it was for payment on a debt the plaintiff owed to the defendant. In this case, the witnesses saw, but didn’t know.
And the flipside:
Knowledge without sight, how so? It is a case where the creditor claims: “You admitted to owing me 100 dinars before so-and-so and so-and-so,” and the debtor replied: “Let so-and-so and so-and-so come and testify.” This is a case of knowledge of the debt without sight.
Here, the witnesses’ testimony is based on having heard the debtor’s admission that they owed the money in question. They may not have seen the transaction take place, but they know about it from the debtor’s own mouth.
How, then, do we know that this provision applies only to monetary claims? Well, we know that the standard for testimony in non-financial cases is higher and that both seeing and understanding is required. If, according to Rabbi Yosei, either seeing or knowing is sufficient for a person to serve as a witness, then we must be talking about financial cases.
Being reluctant to testify can always incur consequences for the litigants, of course, but only in monetary cases does it incur serious consequences for the witness. Those who don’t come forward because they fear a violent criminal are cut some slack.
Read all of Shevuot 33 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on June 2, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
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