Tractate Horayot is concerned with correcting erroneous rulings, either those that issue from a court or from an individual leader, such as a king, nasi or high priest. A mere 14 pages long, it concludes our multi-year exploration of Seder Nezikin, the order of the Talmud that deals with the rabbinic court system. It is both practical, describing the mechanisms for correcting rulings, and cautionary, reminding us what is at stake when a court issues a bad one.
The discussion found in this tractate is rooted in Leviticus 4, which discusses communal transgressions: “If it is the whole community of Israel that has erred and the matter escapes the notice of the congregation, so that they do any of the things that by God’s commandments ought not to be done, and they realize their guilt — when the sin through which they incurred guilt becomes known, the congregation shall offer a bull of the herd as a purgation offering, and bring it before the Tent of Meeting.” (Leviticus 4:13–14)
Leviticus describes a situation in which an entire community spontaneously transgresses God’s law. It calls to mind the episode of the golden calf, when the Israelites were drawn into an act of idolatry. In that case, the communal transgression was made possible by poor leadership — Aaron, Moses’ brother, not only condoned the plan, he personally collected the Israelites’ gold jewelry, recast it into the shape of an idol and declared a festival. Mass, spontaneous transgression seems unlikely, perhaps even impossible, without leadership.
Rhetorically, the Torah holds the entire community accountable, but practically it requires its leaders to offer a bull to atone for the mass sin. The rabbis similarly hold leaders accountable for leading the masses astray, both practically and rhetorically. Here is the opening mishnah of the tractate:
If a court erroneously issued a ruling permitting the Jewish people to violate one of the mitzvot that are stated in the Torah, and an individual proceeded and performed that transgression unwittingly on the basis of the court’s ruling, then whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it with them, or whether the judges performed the transgression and he performed it after them, or whether the judges did not perform the transgression and he performed it alone — in all these cases the individual is exempt from bringing an offering. This is due to the fact that he associated his action with the ruling of the court.
The mishnah not only holds leadership accountable, it explicitly exonerates individuals who unwittingly transgress Torah law by following the ruling of a Jewish court that issued a bad ruling. In this, it goes beyond Leviticus, which also holds the community responsible.
But already in the Gemara on today’s daf, we see a struggle with this idea that individuals bear no responsibility for following erroneous rulings issued by leadership:
Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: This halakhah in the mishnah is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. But the rabbis say: An individual who performs a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court is liable.
The majority of rabbis in the Gemara hold individuals responsible for their transgressions — even when they are simply following the orders of a court (that happened to rule erroneously). Blind obedience to authority is no excuse for violating Torah law.
What do these bad rulings look like? How is atonement made in the wake of transgression? And who, in the end, is responsible for the sins that ensue? All of that remains to be unpacked in this quick but important tractate that wraps up our study of the rabbinic court system.
Read all of Horayot 2 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on September 3, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
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