Avodah Zarah 51

At the bottom of yesterday’s daf, we read the following:

Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: An object of idol worship that is worshipped by a stick, (e.g., by beating a stick on another object in order to produce noise), if one broke a stick before it, he is liable. If he threw a stick before it, he is exempt.

Rashi explains the context for this halakhah by citing a sugya in Tractate Sanhedrin that clarifies which forms of idol worship render a person liable for the death penalty. Anything that is the normal form of worship for a particular idol, like throwing stones at Mercury or defecating before Ba’al Peor, renders one liable. But even acts that are not the normal way of worshiping a particular idol can render a person liable if they resemble acts performed in the Temple. This indicates two primary concerns. First, any act that is the normative form of worshiping a particular idol, even if it doesn’t map on to existing Jewish practice, is clearly intended as worship and therefore forbidden. Second, since the forms of worship in the Temple are the Jewish template for what constitutes worship, the assumption is that performing that act in an idolatrous context is significant, even if it deviates from the normal method of worshiping an idol.

The Gemara then presents a dispute between Abaye and Rava about why one is liable for breaking a stick before this particular idol, but not for tossing it:

Abaye said to Rava: What is different about breaking? One is liable because it is similar to slaughtering an offering. So too, throwing is similar to sprinkling blood on the altar. Rava said to Abaye: (In order for a sacrificial rite to be similar to the sprinkling of blood), I require throwing that scatters, and that is not the case here.

Rava and Abaye agree that whether one is liable for breaking or casting a stick depends on whether it resembles a form of worship in the Temple (since the normal form of worshiping this idol is making noise with a stick, not breaking or tossing it). Where they disagree is about how precisely this action must map on to the Temple paradigm. Both agree that breaking a stick is comparable to the slaughter of an animal offered in the Temple, but Rava argues that even though casting a stick involves a similar motion to sprinkling blood on the altar, it’s not sufficiently similar because in the case of a stick, the object remains intact. Sprinkling blood, however, scatters it. Abaye pushes back on this argument:

He raised an objection: One who fed excrement, or who poured a chamber pot of urine before it as a libation, is liable. Granted, with a chamber pot of urine, there is an act of throwing that scatters. But with excrement, what act of throwing that scatters is there?

Rashi clarifies that we are referring here to an idol that is not normally worshipped by feeding it excrement or pouring urine before it. Therefore, the only way one would be liable is if these acts resemble acts in the Temple. And since feeding excrement to an idol does not lead to scattering like blood and yet the person who does it is still liable, Abaye concludes that merely tossing something is sufficiently similar to sprinkling blood, even if the object remains intact. However, the Gemara provides a resolution for Rava:

This is stated with regard to moist excrement.

Seemingly, the argument is that moist excrement would scatter, and therefore it is indeed sufficiently similar to the act of sprinkling, unlike the case of an intact stick.

While this section might be somewhat repulsive to readers, it is a fascinating demonstration of which acts the rabbis deem significant and worship-like enough that we assume a person is definitely performing an act of worship, regardless of the object.

Read all of Avodah Zarah 51 on Sefaria.

This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on August 8, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.