After devoting much of this chapter to the rules of piggul and the ways incorrect intent can disqualify a sacrifice, the last mishnah of the chapter lists the intents that one should have with regard to an offering:
The slaughtered offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters: For the sake of the particular type of offering; for the sake of the one who sacrifices; for the sake of God; for the sake of the fires; for the sake of the aroma; for the sake of the pleasing (of God); and, in the cases of a sin offering and a guilt offering, for the sake of the sin.
Rabbi Yosei says: Even one who did not have in mind for the sake of any one of these, the offering is valid, as it is a stipulation of the court that the intent follows only the one performing the sacrificial rite.
Most commentators understand this mishnah as requiring these six intentions at the time of slaughter. It’s not enough for a person to avoid improper intent; they must also have correct intent about the desired purpose and impact of their offering.
The Gemara brings a teaching of Rav which attempts to both locate these rules within a verse, and elaborate upon their meanings, some of which are more self-explanatory than others. Rav derives them all from this verse, attaching each word or phrase to a particular intent: “A burnt offering, an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:9).
The first intention calls back to the opening mishnah of the tractate. There, we learned that with most sacrifices that were sacrificed not for their own sake (for example, slaughtering a burnt offering with the intent that it be a peace offering), they can be consumed, but they have not fulfilled the owner’s obligation. A sin offering and a paschal offering are both disqualified even for consumption if they were not offered for their own sake. So in order for an offering to fulfill its intended purpose, one must sacrifice a peace offering for the sake of a peace offering a burnt offering for the sake of a burnt offering, and so on.
The second intention is the only one for which Rav does not provide a derivation, but it’s seemingly more straightforward: Just as a Jewish divorce document must be written specifically for the man and woman divorcing, so too a sacrifice must be offered specifically for the sake of the one bringing it. If I bring a sin offering, the one doing the slaughtering cannot merely think they are sacrificing a sin offering. They must intend to sacrifice the animal specifically for me for the purpose of atoning for my sin.
The third intent, for the sake of God, indicates that one must specifically have in mind that these offerings are directed to the Holy Blessed One. They are not directed toward any other divinity, nor are they seen as functioning in the absence of our relationship with God.
The fourth intent is more ambiguous. Rav clarifies that for the sake of the fires means one must intend that the sacrifice be fully burned on the altar, rather than lightly charred or barbecued. Likewise, for the sake of the aroma is also rather unclear — what does it mean exactly to sacrifice for the sake of a smell? Rav clarifies that this is to invalidate an offering that was roasted prior to the altar, as it will no longer produce the same enticing smells when being burnt a second time. Given the frequency with which the Torah uses the phrase reiach nichoach l’adonai (“a pleasing odor to the Lord”) when describing sacrifices, it’s understandable that the production of a pleasing scent would be viewed as indispensable.
Finally, we have the intention of pleasing God. Not only is one required to direct the sacrifice towards God, but one must intend that our desired recipient derive pleasure from our offering.
Having broken down the nature of these intentions, we now have to understand the relationship of the mishnah’s two clauses. Since Rabbi Yosei declares it a stipulation of the court that the only one whose intent matters is the person performing the service, many commentators assume that when he says these intents are not required, he’s referring to the act of slaughtering, a non-ritual act that can be performed by non-priests. Therefore, in contrast to Rabbi Yosei, the first clause would seem to be claiming that these intentions are necessary during both slaughter and the subsequent steps of the sacrificial process.
Maimonides has a drastically different read. He claims that since it has been established earlier in the tractate that one is not required to have intent while slaughtering, the first clause of the mishnah must be claiming that the owner of a sacrifice must have these intentions in addition to the one offering it, i.e. the priest. According to this read, Rabbi Yosei comes to insist that only the one performing the service must have intent, but the owner’s intentions are not necessary for the offering to be successful.
While each interpretation has its difficulties, these divergent explanations are not surprising given the terseness of the mishnah. Regardless, there is something poetic about concluding this chapter about improper intent by establishing the ways in which one should direct their minds and hearts when offering a sacrifice.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on October 30, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
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