Zevachim 3

Faulty analogies.

Talmud
Advertisement

Rav Pappa was away from the study hall and missed out on the learning. So he asked Ravina to fill him in by sharing his notes from Rava’s class. A new section of his notes begins on today’s daf with a question:

Did Rav Yehuda say that Rav says that a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered the animal for the sake of consumption of non-sacred meat, it is fit?


This question deals with two scenarios that both involve a moment of misintention at the point when the animal is slaughtered. The first involves a person who is obligated to bring a sin offering, but at the moment they slaughter the animal, they have a mental lapse and think that they are bringing a burnt offering. The consequence is that the animal can no longer be used for the required sin offering.

The second scenario is similar to the first, except that at the moment of their mental lapse, they believe they are slaughtering the animal to eat its meat rather than to sacrifice it. In such a case, the animal is still fit for the sin offering they are meant to bring. The implication here is that a deviation of intention within a category (in this case, sacrifices) renders the sacrifice unfit, but a change to another category (in this case, from sacrifice to dinner) does not. If this is indeed what Rav has taught, then Rav has to contend with the following mishnah (from Gittin 24a) that seems to contradict his teaching:

Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman is not valid; and even for the sake of a gentile woman, it is not valid. 


Just as a divorce decree written for a particular Jewish woman cannot be used for another, so too an animal that is slaughtered for one type of sacrifice cannot be used for another. So far so good. But a non-Jewish woman is not subject to the rabbinic laws of divorce, so when a bill of divorce is written in her name it has not actually been legally designated for her. Yet according to this mishnah, it still cannot be subsequently assigned to a Jewish woman of the same name. Likewise, it would seem that when an animal is slaughtered with the intention of eating its meat (a non-sacred act), one should also be prohibited from assigning it to be a sacrifice after the fact. Yet Rav permits doing so. How is that possible?

Having raised this contradiction in his lecture, Rava now resolves it by pointing out a difference between the two cases. A bill of divorce requires intention at the time of its writing, he reminds us. So when someone writes one for a non-Jewish woman, even if we were to ignore their erroneous intention, the document would be like one that was written with no one in particular in mind. This still invalidates it for use in the divorce proceedings of another woman, as she was not the intended receiver of the document as it was being prepared.

The rules for sacrifices are different. Offerings that are slaughtered without being assigned to a specific sacrifice are still fit for use. So if we were to set aside the person’s erroneous intention to eat the animal, it would be as if they slaughtered the animal without yet having assigned it to a specific sacrifice. Since the animal would still be fit for use in the latter scenario, it is in the former as well. Apparent contradiction resolved.

The Talmud often applies the logic of one context to another to determine what the rules should be. And just as often, it decides that the two contexts are different in a way that makes the legal decision in one not applicable to the other. This is a case of the latter. Thanks to Ravina, in the event Rav Pappa finds himself in a position to rule on such a case, he likely won’t erroneously make use of the laws regarding divorce documents to determine if a particular sacrifice is fit or not. Or, given that the chances are low that such a case would never appear before him in the post-Temple period, Rav Pappa at least has a chance to sharpen his analytical skills to make sure he does not rely on a faulty analogy in some other situation.

Read all of Zevachim 3 on Sefaria.

This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on September 17, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.

Help us keep Jewish knowledge accessible to millions of people around the world.

With your help, My Jewish Learning can provide endless opportunities for learning, connection and discovery.

Advertisement
Advertisement
Advertisement
Advertisement