In considering accountability for a court’s mistakes, one factor is whether the judgment was legitimately rendered in the first place. According to a mishnah on today’s daf, if one of the judges told his colleagues they were in error, or if the most distinguished judge was absent, or if one judge was disqualified for any number of reasons, the court is exempt.
What’s the logic here?
As “assembly” is stated here and “assembly” is stated there. Just as in the “assembly” stated there, all (the judges must be) fit to issue rulings, so too, in the “assembly” stated here, unless (all the judges will be) fit to issue rulings.
Remember our old friend the gezerah shavah, where the same word appearing in two passages allows the rabbis to apply lessons learned in one context to the other? It’s back, and the key word now is “assembly,” which we see in two biblical verses. In Leviticus 4:13, we learn: “And if the entire assembly of Israel shall act unwittingly.” And in Numbers 35:24, which concerns the laws of accidental murder, we learn: “And the assembly shall judge between the one who struck and the blood redeemer.” In the latter situation, the rabbis require each person in the assembly considering a capital case to be a legitimate judge. Consequently, in Leviticus 4:13, which is the source of the laws regarding the responsibility of erring courts, the use of assembly likewise indicates that a legitimate court must be constituted if it is to be held collectively responsible for its errors. If it’s not legitimate, the rulings are ineffective and the court as a whole can’t be held responsible for its error.
And where does the requirement of complete tribunal legitimacy in the case of capital cases come from? The Gemara responds:
As Rav Hisda says, the verse states: “That they may stand there with you” (Numbers 11:16). “With you” means with similarity to you.
In Numbers 11, Moses complains to God about the difficulty of leading the Israelites in the desert, so God commands him to gather 70 elders of Israel to share the burden. The text says that they should “stand there with you,” which Rav Hisda understands to mean that they were similar in qualifications and competence to Moses. He concludes from this that all judges on a tribunal must be fit to decide cases and issue rulings, just like Moses.
The Gemara cautions against taking this too far:
And say that “with you,” means fit for the Divine Presence. Rather, Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak says as the verse states, “and bear it with you” (Exodus 18:22). “With you” means similar to you.
Given Moses’ stature, it seems a bit much to expect that judges are as qualified as him. So Rav Nahman provides an alternate prooftext. When Moses’ father-in-law saw how exhausted he was from judging cases, he suggested that Moses appoint subordinate judges to take some of the burden from his shoulders and “bear it with you.” This seems more reasonable: Judges don’t need to be Moses, they just have to be capable of providing support and serving the people in a judicial capacity.
Through this reasoning, the mishnah and the Gemara provide a bit of an out: If there was anyone among the judges who wasn’t qualified to serve under Moses, the entire ruling is void and the tribunal as a whole can’t be held responsible if it makes a mistake. In this way, one rotten apple spoils the verdict, but might save the panel.
Read all of Horayot 4 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on September 4, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
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