As we’ve seen, sacrifices in the Temple were slaughtered and their blood sprinkled on the altar. But there were actually two altars in the Temple — an outer altar, located in the Temple courtyard, and an inner altar in the sanctuary. While most sacrifices were offered on the courtyard altar, others had their blood sprinkled on the golden altar and the curtain in the sanctuary. On yesterday’s daf, we learned in a mishnah that if the blood of these two types of offerings were mixed, it should not be sprinkled at all but poured down the drain. However if some happened to have been sprinkled on the outer altar and then more more was sprinkled on the inner altar, the sacrifices are considered effective.
But what about a case where the blood mixture was sprinkled first inside the sanctuary? On this point, the rabbis disagree.
(If the priest placed the blood) inside and again placed it outside, Rabbi Akiva deems it disqualified and the rabbis deem it fit. As Rabbi Akiva says: Any blood (that is to be presented outside) that entered to atone in the sanctuary is disqualified, but the rabbis say: Only the sin offering, as it is written: “And any sin offering, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to atone in the sanctuary, shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 6:23).
At least with regard to a regular sin offering, which is meant to be offered outside, everyone agrees that once its blood has been brought into the Temple it is disqualified. The debate between Rabbi Akiva and the rabbis hinges on whether the sin offering is a paradigm or an exception. Rabbi Akiva holds that the sin offering is a paradigm for all offerings, while the rabbis maintain that it is an exception.
Attempting to explain Rabbi Akiva’s reasoning, the rabbis on today’s daf present a parable:
Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: Hear a parable: To what is this matter comparable? To a student who mixed wine with hot water for his teacher. And the teacher said to him: Mix another drink for me.
The student said to him: With what?
The teacher said to him: Aren’t we dealing with hot water? Now either in hot water or in cold.
Here too, since we have been dealing with a sin offering in that passage (see Leviticus 6:17–22), why do I need the term “sin offering” that the Merciful One writes in this verse? Rather, I do not say this about a sin offering alone, but all sacrificial animals.
According to Shmuel, Rabbi Akiva’s derivation is premised on the meaning that we derive from unnecessary repetition or explication. In the parable, a student had already mixed wine (as was the custom at the time) with hot water for his teacher. Had the teacher merely asked for another glass of wine, the student could have assumed he meant another glass like the one he already had. But since the teacher specified that the student “mix” another drink, we assume he’s clarifying that any form of mixing would be acceptable, even with cold water. While it might at first seem unintuitive to say that when a person is more specific in their request it actually implies a more expansive meaning, Rashi explains that when a person is discussing a particular matter, they often don’t feel the need to continuously remind others what they are talking about because that’s the default assumption. Unnecessary specification, therefore, implies an expansion of the subject at hand.
Applied to our case, if the Torah is dealing with the rules of a sin offering, why would the verse have specified the sin offering when introducing this law? The verse could have simply said: “And if its blood is brought into the Temple …” We would have assumed the verse was still speaking about a sin offering, like the verses preceding it. From the fact that the verse unnecessarily mentioned that we are speaking of a sin offering, Rabbi Akiva learns that this rule is in fact meant to apply to all offerings.
This parable is an interesting example of the Gemara trying to map hermeneutical logic onto common-sense assumptions about human behavior. It’s also an example of a hermeneutical principle we see in several places, which can at first seem counterintuitive: Since we think the Torah never states anything without purpose, a seemingly extraneous specification can actually broaden a rule’s application.
Read all of Zevachim 82 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on December 5, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
