Zevachim 60

On yesterday’s daf, Rava taught that all offerings sacrificed on a damaged altar are disqualified. On today’s daf, Rabbi Elazar teaches that not only are offerings sacrificed on such an altar disqualified, but even those offerings that have already been sacrificed cannot be consumed so long as the altar is damaged. Rabbi Elazar only teaches this law with regard to the meal offering, but the Gemara applies this rule to other offerings of the most sacred order, as the line from which this rule is derived for the meal offering ends with the statement “for it is most holy.” (Leviticus 10:12) From this we learn that the rule applies to all offerings of the most sacred order.

The Gemara proceeds to further expand the scope of this law:

From where (is it derived that this law also applies to) offerings of lesser sanctity? Abaye said: It is derived from the exposition of Rabbi Yosei, as it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei says three matters in the name of three elders, and this is one of them: Rabbi Yishmael says: One might have thought that a person would bring second-tithe produce up to Jerusalem in the present and eat it. And it could be derived by means of a logical inference (that one may not do so): A firstborn offering requires bringing it to the place (to Jerusalem) and second-tithe produce requires bringing it to the place (see Deuteronomy 12:17–18); just as the firstborn offering (may be eaten there) only in the presence of the Temple, so too, second-tithe produce (may be eaten there) only in the presence of the Temple.

We have a beraita which teaches that not only can a firstborn (an offering of lesser sanctity) not be eaten in Jerusalem in the absence of the Temple, but even second-tithe is disqualified. Though our original law specifically mentioned a damaged altar, and here the issue is the total absence of a Temple and altar, the Gemara seems to understand these conditions as synonymous: When we ask whether something can be offered and eaten with a damaged altar, what we are asking is whether it can be offered and eaten in the absence of a functioning Temple and its facilities. 

The Gemara challenges Rabbi Yishmael’s logic:

What does Rabbi Yishmael hold? If he holds that the initial consecration (of Jerusalem) sanctified it for its time and sanctified it forever, even a firstborn animal (may be eaten). And if he holds it did not sanctify it forever, let the dilemma be raised with regard to a firstborn as well.

Rabbi Yishmael stated that a firstborn could not be eaten in the absence of the Temple as a given, and used that rule to derive the law for second tithe. But what’s the underlying logic?

There’s a dispute about whether, when Jerusalem was first sanctified upon the establishment of the First Temple, it was imbued with permanent sanctity, or whether that sanctity is conditioned upon the presence of a Temple. When this dispute is presented in Tractate Megillah, the Gemara states that those who believe Jerusalem is sanctified permanently believe one could therefore eat both offerings of lesser sanctity and second tithe in Jerusalem in the absence of a Temple. Therefore, if Rabbi Yishmael had thought that perhaps second tithe might be consumed in the absence of a Temple due to the city’s remaining sanctity, he should have wondered the same thing with regard to a firstborn offering. And if he believes there is no permanent sanctity, and yet he still wondered whether second tithe could be eaten in Jerusalem, why didn’t he raise the same question with regard to a firstborn?

Ravina answers that Rabbi Yishmael in fact holds the initial consecration did not sanctify Jerusalem forever and his ruling about the first born is derived from a verse:

Its meat was juxtaposed with its blood, as it is stated: “You shall sprinkle their blood…and you shall burn their fats…and their flesh shall be yours” (Numbers 18:17–18). This teaches that just as its blood is sprinkled only on the altar, so too, its meat may be consumed only in a time when there is an altar. And the case of second-tithe produce comes and is derived from the case of a firstborn.

Rabbi Yishmael’s ruling that a firstborn offering can only be consumed when the Temple stands isn’t drawn from thin air. Rather, it emerges from the juxtaposition of laws concerning blood and meat in the verses from Numbers relating to the firstborn offering. Once Rabbi Yishmael has established that a firstborn offering — and by extension, other offerings of lesser sanctity — cannot be eaten without a functioning altar, he’s able to derive the same rule for second tithe, as seen above.

We’ve seen many intricate derivations throughout this tractate as the rabbis attempt to elaborate the specifics of a system they no longer are practicing. Here, we see those same derivation techniques applied in a way that acknowledges the rabbis’ current reality of exile, and their need to determine whether the offerings can function in a post-Temple world.