Thus far in this chapter of Tractate Zevachim, we have considered the number of days during which a sacrifice can be eaten, but we haven’t considered the timeline for the sacrificial process itself. On today’s daf, Rav Yitzhak bar Avudimi offers this teaching:
Rav Yitzhak bar Avudimi says: From where is it derived that the blood becomes disqualified at sunset? As it is stated: “But if the sacrifice of his offering be a vow, or a gift offering, it shall be eaten on the day that he sacrifices his offering , and on the morrow” (Leviticus 7:16). This means that on the day that you slaughter, you sacrifice. On the day that you do not slaughter, you may not sacrifice it.
At first glance, the verse Rav Yitzhak bar Avudimi is citing appears to be simply teaching a rule about restrictions on how long one can eat an offering after it’s been sacrificed. However, he notes the phrase “on the day that he sacrifices his offering” juxtaposes two terms: sacrifices (hikrivo) and offerings (zivcho). The former refers to the entire ritual process surrounding offerings and the latter, in this case at least, literally refers to the act of slaughter. This implies, according to Rav Yitzhak bar Avudimi, that these two actions must happen on the same day. So if I slaughtered an animal on Monday, but don’t present its blood on the altar until Tuesday, the offering is disqualified.
The Gemara challenges his derivation:
But he requires this for itself!
The Gemara’s challenge suggests that this verse is not “available” for further exegesis because it’s needed to teach the ruling that a peace offering can only be eaten on the day of its slaughtering and the day after. Since that verse is already the source of a law, it can’t also be used to derive a second law.
The Gemara dismisses its challenge:
If so, let the verse state: On the day he slaughters it shall it be eaten. Why do I need “that he sacrifices it”? Conclude from this that on the day that you slaughter, you sacrifice. But on a day that you do not slaughter, you do not sacrifice.
We don’t need the verse to mention both slaughter and sacrifice. If it was only coming to teach us about the time limit for consumption, mention of slaughter alone would suffice. Therefore, the extraneous term “that he sacrifices” is available to teach an additional rule: that the sacrificial process must happen on the same day as the slaughter.
The Gemara proceeds to question its own proof. Perhaps the mention of sacrifice isn’t extraneous at all, but is coming to teach us that the time frame for eating a sacrifice is dependent not on the day when it’s slaughtered, but the day when it’s offered on the altar, with the requisite placements of blood. But the Gemara dismisses this too with similar logic: If the verse intended to teach that the timeline for eating an offering is dependent on the time of its slaughtering, it didn’t need to mention sacrifice. And if it was coming to teach that the consumption time is actually dependent on the time of sacrifice, it didn’t need to mention slaughter. Either way, the verse still has an extraneous element. The conversation ultimately concludes in favor of Rav Yitzhak bar Avudimi: The inclusion of both these terms in our verse teaches that both slaughter and sacrifice of an animal must happen on the same day.
Read all of Zevachim 56 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on November 9, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
