On yesterday’s daf, the Gemara mentioned Rabbi Yishmael’s 13 principles, a series of hermeneutic rules that govern how we derive Jewish law from sacred text. Some of these principles, like kal vachomer (a fortiori inference) and gezerah shavah (verbal analogy), we’ve encountered many times already in our Daf Yomi study. On today’s daf, the rabbis consider a number of questions about the relationship between these principles. Here’s one:
What is the law as to whether a matter derived via a verbal analogy can teach its law to another matter via a juxtaposition?
The gezerah shavah is a method of deriving law in which a word that appears in two places in the Torah indicates some connection between the laws discussed in both. The principle of juxtaposition indicates that there is a connection between two sets of laws that are next to each other in the Torah. The Gemara is asking here whether a law that has been derived via a verbal analogy can then be used to derive another law via juxtaposition.
Rav Pappa offers an example:
Rav Pappa says: The verse states: “And this is the law of the sacrifice of peace offerings, which one may offer to the Lord. If he sacrifices it for a thanks offering, then he shall offer with the thanks offering unleavened cakes mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers spread with oil, and cakes mingled with oil, of fine flour soaked” (Leviticus 7:11–12).
(From this juxtaposition) we have learned that (the money to purchase) a thanks offering can come from (money used to redeem) the second tithe, since we find that (the money to purchase) a peace offering can come from (money used to redeem the second) tithe.
Rav Pappa brings in a verse from the Torah about the peace offering that begins with a mention of “thanksgiving.” While the plain meaning of the verse is that the Torah is giving instructions regarding what to do if thanksgiving is the motive for bringing a peace offering, the Gemara chooses to see the word “thanksgiving” as a reference to the thanksgiving offering. From this juxtaposition, the rabbis derive that a law concerning peace offerings (that the money used to purchase them can come from money used to redeem the second tithe) also applies to thanksgiving offerings. Those too can be purchased with money used to redeem the second tithe.
As a quick refresher: The second tithe is the percentage of agricultural produce set aside in the first, second, fourth and fifth years of the seven-year sabbatical cycle. This tithe was to be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there, but anyone who could not or did not want to travel to Jerusalem could redeem the tithe for a coin of equal value plus one-fifth of its value. The produce itself could then be used normally and the money used for other purposes, in this case purchasing an animal used for a peace offering or a thanksgiving offering.
And now for the verbal analogy:
As it is written: “And you shall sacrifice peace offerings and shall eat there” (Deuteronomy 27:7). And it is written: “And you shall eat before the Lord your God, in the place which He shall choose to cause His name to dwell there” (Deuteronomy 14:23).
This is a classic use of the verbal analogy. A verse about peace offerings uses the word “there,” as does a verse about the second tithe. The use of the same word indicates a halachic connection between the two — in this case, that the money from redeeming the second tithe can be used for a peace offering. And so, this is (ostensibly) a case in which a law derived via a verbal analogy (that the money from redeeming the second tithe can be used for a peace offering) can then teach a law via juxtaposition (that the money from redeeming the second tithe can be used for a thanksgiving offering).
Rav Pappa’s proposed example is intended to examine whether or not it is possible to work around the principle laid out in yesterday’s daf — that a law that has been derived using a hermeneutical principle cannot then be used to derive another law, thereby allowing for the possibility of an infinite chain of derivations. Rav Pappa wants to know whether this principle holds when two different hermeneutic principles are being used.
Mar Zutra raises an objection: While it’s one thing to say that a law derived from a verbal analogy can then be used to derive another law through juxtaposition, in this case we’re deriving laws about sacrifices from second tithes. In Jewish law, it’s not possible to derive laws about the sacred (i.e. sacrifices) from laws about the profane (i.e. second tithes). So Rav Pappa’s example doesn’t work, though it leaves open the possibility that the underlying idea still might. Ravina, however, responds with the bottom line: whether there is one principle being used in a chain of derivations or two separate principles, a derivation is still being used to teach a derivation. That is invalid.
But in the Talmud, hope springs eternal, as the rabbis will go on to test a number of combinations of hermeneutical principles to test the boundaries of how laws can be learned and derived.
Read all of Zevachim 50 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on November 3, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
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