Zevachim 49

For the last several pages, the Gemara has been examining the derivation of the rules about where sacrifices can be slaughtered and their blood collected. At the bottom of yesterday’s daf, the Gemara notes that while we’ve derived that the ideal way to sacrifice a burnt offering is to slaughter and collect the blood in the north of the Temple courtyard, we haven’t yet found a source proving that slaughtering and collecting elsewhere would disqualify a burnt offering.

Rav Adda bar Ahava offered a suggestion. Earlier in the Gemara, we derived that, for a sin offering, slaughtering or collecting blood anywhere but the north of the courtyard disqualifies it. We only know that the sin offering has any requirement to slaughter or collect in the north because of a verse comparing the sin offering to the burnt offering (Leviticus 4:29: “And slaughter the sin offering in the place of the burnt offering”). It follows logically, Rav Adda argues, that the same strictures which apply to a sin offering’s location would also apply to the burnt offering, the case from which it’s derived. 

The Gemara pushed back on this suggestion, noting that sin offerings are in some other respects more stringent than burnt offerings, and so perhaps here too they have a more stringent ruling about the slaughter and collection of blood. Ravina, however, defends Rav Adda bar Ahava’s logical derivation:

Have we ever found that a secondary (prohibition) is more stringent than a primary (prohibition)?

To understand Ravina’s question, we must define the usage of tafel (translated here as “secondary” and ikar (“primary”). Something that is tafel is of secondary import, or subsidiary. Ikar is the essential or fundamental thing. In our case, Rashi explains that the burnt offering is the essential thing because the verse that teaches about the requirement to slaughter in the north of the courtyard is specifically written with regard to a burnt offering. The sin offering is a secondary or dependent case, because we learn its ruling only from its juxtaposition to the burnt offering. 

Ravina is suggesting here that if you have one case whose ruling is clear, and another derived from it, the derived ruling shouldn’t be more stringent than its source. Mar Zutra, however, argues that we do find cases of a secondary case with greater stringency:

But there is the (second) tithe, which may be redeemed, whereas (food) purchased with second-tithe money may not be redeemed. As we learned : Food that was purchased with second-tithe money and then became ritually impure must be redeemed with money. Rabbi Yehuda says: It must be buried. The Gemara infers from the mishna: If the food purchased with the second-tithe money became impure, yes, it may be redeemed, but if it did not become impure, it may not be redeemed. 

As a reminder, ma’aser sheni (or “second tithe”) is the tithe separated from one’s produce after the priestly portion and ma’aser rishon (the Levites’ portion) have been taken. Unlike those other tithes, the second tithe can be consumed by the owner, but only in Jerusalem. If schlepping all that produce to Jerusalem is impractical, an owner can redeem the produce, transferring its sanctity to money equivalent in value. Now the produce has no limitations, but the money (which is far more portable) must be brought to Jerusalem and used to purchase food within the city, where the food must be eaten. 

Mar Zutra points out one can redeem the original ma’aser sheni produce under any circumstances, including if it becomes impure. By contrast, produce that was bought with ma’aser sheni coins can only be redeemed with money if it becomes impure, and according to Rabbi Yehuda, it can’t be redeemed at all! This is seemingly an example where a secondary prohibition is more stringent than the original.

Interestingly, the categories of primary and secondary here are slightly different from the definition given above. Here, the primary case is the ma’aser sheni produce itself, which originally bears this special status. The secondary case, rather than being one whose ruling is derived from the former, is simply several steps removed in application. In this case, produce bought with ma’aser sheni money is secondary because it only has any sanctity on account of the original ma’aser sheni produce. 

Nevertheless, this would seem to contradict Ravina’s assertion that a secondary case never has greater stringency. The Gemara, however, dismisses this proof, arguing that this is not a stringency, but a result of the produce bought with ma’aser sheni money in fact having a lesser sactity than original ma’aser sheni produce.

Mar Zutra then makes two more attempts, and those are dismissed as well. The discussion thus concludes in favor of Ravina, which means we can in fact rule like Rav Adda bar Ahava: Any stringencies with regard to location that apply to a sin offering also apply to the burnt offering from which it is derived. But it also teaches us a broader principle: Secondary cases cannot have stricter laws than the primary case upon which it is based. That principle stands even outside our specific example.

Read all of Zevachim 49 on Sefaria.

This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on November 2, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.