The mishnah at the beginning of this chapter stated that if a person admits to part of a monetary claim, they are required to take an oath denying the remainder of the claim. However, if a person fully denies a monetary claim, they are exempt from swearing the oath. There are exceptions, but this is the general rule. Today’s Gemara, troubled by this ruling, modifies it:
The mishnah teaches that if the claimant said: “I have one 100 dinars in your possession,” and the defendant responded: “Nothing of yours is in my possession,” he is exempt from swearing an oath.
Rav Nahman says: The court administers an oath of inducement to him.
What is the reason? There is a presumption that one does not make a claim unless he has a valid case against the other party.
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While on a Torah level a person cannot be obligated in an oath when denying the entire claim against them, Rav Nahman rules that we nonetheless apply an oath of inducement to the defendant. Presumably Rav Nahman, who worked as a judge, felt this was good jurisprudence; if a person can avoid liability both for paying and for taking an oath denying they owe money, what’s to stop people from brazenly denying their creditors’ claims? Since we assume most people aren’t going to the trouble of dragging someone to court unless they have some legitimate reason, Rav Nahman institutes at least a rabbinic-level consequence for denying a debt.
But the Gemara swiftly makes the opposite case:
On the contrary; there is a presumption that a person does not exhibit insolence by lying in the presence of his creditor.
The primary rationale for the Torah-level ruling that one who completely denies a claim is exempt from swearing is that people are generally not so brazen as to completely deny owing any money to a person who not only knows for certain they’re lying, but in fact did them a kindness by lending them money! (Without interest, if they’re a fellow Jew, making it even more likely to be an altruistic gesture.) Given that we presume most people are not chutzpadik enough to make such a denial, why should we require this defendant to swear even a rabbinic-level oath?
The Gemara answers this concern by suggesting that perhaps this person’s denial is not pure impudence:
He may be temporarily avoiding paying him. He rationalizes doing so by saying to himself: I am avoiding him only until the time that I have enough money, and then I will repay him.
Perhaps the defendant simply doesn’t have the money at this moment to pay back their loan, and doesn’t want to go further in debt; therefore, they’re rationalizing to themselves that this is only a temporary measure, and they will eventually pay back their creditor. People might not be so brazen as to completely deny owing a debt in order to avoid payment altogether, but someone might do so in order to buy themselves time to gather the funds.
The Gemara supports this notion:
Know that denial of a debt is not considered an outright lie, as Rav Idi bar Avin says that Rav Hisda says: One who denies a claim with regard to a loan is fit to bear witness even if his denial is proven untrue. But one who denies a claim with regard to a deposit and is proven to be lying is disqualified from bearing witness.
Even if a person is proven to have lied about a debt — i.e., witnesses later come and clarify that they do owe the money — that person is not invalidated from future testimony, because we don’t consider them to be in the general category of someone who is chashud al mamona, suspect with regard to monetary matters. We assume they’re not trying to steal from the creditor, only buying time to pay back their debt. But this same logic seemingly cannot apply to a person with whom money or objects were deposited; if you gave me a gold watch for safekeeping and I later deny having ever received it, there is no good reason I shouldn’t have the watch available and ready to return! Therefore, if I’m proven to have falsely denied having this deposit, the assumption is that I’m merely trying to steal from the person who deposited the object with me.
This is an excellent example of a tension that exists within a lot of Seder Nezikin: The rabbis simultaneously want to account for and protect against potential trickery, deception and theft, while also assuming that most people being brought to court are not wicked thieves. If we can imagine a charitable reason a person might be denying a claim, we don’t default to assuming they have baldly malicious intent; but in the absence of a compelling justification, such as in the case of a deposit, we are forced to assume the defendant is attempting theft.
So just how much benefit of the doubt do we give? Some but not all. Ultimately, Jewish law follows Rav Nahman: Even in cases where a Torah-level oath is not required, the court administers a rabbinic-level oath. While a rabbinic oath holds less weight, it will still hopefully deter people from lying in court.
Read all of Shevuot 40 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on June 10, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
