Shevuot 34

Today’s discussion will make more sense if you read yesterday’s piece. There, we discussed why the rabbis limit liability for those who refuse to testify to monetary (not criminal) cases. Several explanations were given on yesterday’s daf, including one from Rabbi Yosei HaGelili who noted the phrase in Leviticus 5:1, “seen or learned,” means that a person who knows about a matter without having witnessed it directly or a person who witnessed something but does not have full knowledge of what they saw are both required to testify if called to do so. But this kind of limited knowledge is only actionable in a monetary case — hence the conclusion that witnesses who refuse to testify are liable for a sacrifice only in monetary cases.

In response to hearing this teaching, Rav Pappa asks Abaye if it is safe to say that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili agrees with Rabbi Aha, who says the following:

If there is a rutting male camel that is rampaging among other camels and then a camel was found killed at its side, it is evident that the rampaging camel killed it.

This is also a monetary case, but there’s an element of violence involved, since one person’s camel killed another person’s camel (and now owes the latter compensation). Rabbi Aha’s statement does not refer to the oath of testimony, but it does suggest that we need witnesses who saw the rampaging camel attack and kill another in order to hold its owner accountable for the damage. Rabbi Aha says that testimony about the attack and the proximity of the camel corpse to the ill-behaved camel is sufficient.

If we are willing to consider that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili agrees with Rav Aha, asks the Gemara, we should also consider if he concurs with the Rabbi Shimon ben Shetach, who said:

I will not see the consolation of Israel if I did not see one who was running after another into a ruin, and I ran after him and found a sword in his hand and blood dripping from the sword, and the slain person convulsing. I said to him: “Wicked one, who killed this person? It was either me or you, as there is no one else here. But what can I do, as your blood is not given to my control and I have no jurisdiction to execute you, as the Torah says: On the basis of two witnesses or three witnesses shall he that is to die be put to death. (Deuteronomy 17:6) — and there are no witnesses here. Rather, the Omnipresent will exact retribution from you.”

Shimon ben Shetach does not witness the actual killing, though the circumstantial evidence — from the fleeing victim to the dripping sword — is overwhelming. He further admits that his testimony is not sufficient to condemn the killer in a human court because he is the lone witness, and two witnesses are required to reach conviction. Had a second person been present to corroborate his testimony, one can infer that Shimon ben Shetach believes that their joint testimony would be sufficient to convict, even though his information is partial since he didn’t see the actual slaying.

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s original statement is about the obligation of a witness with partial information to testify. What the Gemara is pursuing here is whether he also thinks that such testimony is enough to convict in monetary cases and, if so, in capital cases as well.
 
As it turns out, this conversation is an academic one, with little to no impact on the law. This is because the Torah and the later legal commentaries are clear: Direct evidence is necessary to convict in both monetary and capital cases; nonetheless, witnesses have an obligation to testify, whether they saw something, know something, or both. But it’s hard to remove that mental image of the dripping sword and the notion that Shimon ben Shetach could not get justice for the murder victim — at least not from a human court.

Read all of Shevuot 34 on Sefaria.

This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on June 4, 2025. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.