Menachot 93

Today’s daf continues the topic of semichah — laying one’s hands on an animal sacrifice before it is slaughtered. As we discussed yesterday, the meaning of this ritual is not fully defined by the Torah or rabbinic sources. It seems to be a way of solidifying the connection between a person and their sacrifice, potentially transferring a piece of their identity and guilt for their sins onto the animal and strengthening the process of atonement. In any case, once semichah is considered an obligatory step in many sacrifices, the question arises of who is included in this mitzvah. Today’s mishnah specifies who is required or allowed to do semichah for personal sacrifices and who is excluded:

All lay hands on an offering except a person who is deaf, a person with an intellectual disability, a minor, a blind person, a gentile, an enslaved person, an agent or a wife/woman.

The mishnah teaches that there are eight categories of people who cannot or do not perform semichah. This is a somewhat eclectic list and makes more sense when broken down into subcategories, as the Gemara will do in its analysis. The thing these groups have in common is a nonstandard relationship to mitzvot, at least when compared to the paradigmatic adult, free, male, able-bodied Israelite. (Like with many similar rabbinic texts, it is not totally clear from this mishnah whether the lack of obligation in the mitzvah translates to it being actually prohibited or simply optional for these groups.)

The first three categories of a deaf person, a person with an intellectual disability and a minor are a classic grouping in many areas of Jewish law, and the Gemara notes that this group has a consistent logic:

It is logical, the exclusion of a deaf person, a person with an intellectual disability and a minor — as they are not mentally competent. 

In Jewish law, these three categories of people are not considered b’nei da’at — that is, they are not considered to have full mental capacity; therefore, they are not generally considered responsible for their actions. In the rabbis’ cultural and technological context, people who could not hear or speak were assumed to have mental disability as well. (As technology and scientific understanding have evolved, much of Jewish law has come to understand that deafness is not an intellectual disability.) Because of this assumed lack of capacity, this group of three is generally considered exempt from performing mitzvot, so it makes sense that they would also be exempt from this particular mitzvah. Additionally, they would not usually be bringing independent sacrifices in the first place. 

The Gemara also sees the exclusion of non-Jews in a similar category — they are not obligated in mitzvot writ large and are therefore not obligated in this particular mitzvah, even if they are permitted to bring certain sacrifices. The reason for a blind person’s exclusion is the least obvious, and the Gemara devotes considerable discussion to understanding and deriving this particular law. (Like deaf and non-verbal people, the legal category of a blind person has also evolved considerably over time in many areas of Jewish law.)

The final subgroup from the mishnah comprises an enslaved person, agent and wife/woman. The Gemara brings a beraita deriving these particular exclusions from the three repetitions of the word yado, “his hand,” in the description of semichah in Leviticus Chapter 3:

“His hand” — but not the hand of his slave; “his hand” — but not the hand of his agent; “his hand” — but not the hand of his wife.

Based on their grouping together and the explanation in this beraita, it seems that these last three categories should be read in the context of their relationship to a free male Israelite. The thing that those in this category have in common is that they may sometimes be considered “like” or as extensions of the male Israelite himself. An enslaved person would have been considered the property of their owner, and therefore, the owner would bear responsibility for most of their actions. An agent is not an inherent state of being; rather, it is a temporary legal position one assumes in order to do something on behalf of another, relying on the legal principle that “a person’s agent is like himself.” A man’s wife, the Gemara tells us, is considered “like his own flesh/body” for many areas of law, and she can be treated as an extension of her husband. 

Given this context, it seems that this excluded subgroup is less about permanent or innate characteristics and more about emphasizing the principle that individuals have to do semichah for themselves. We know, for instance, that a person acting as an agent in one context is certainly still obligated in semichah when bringing their own sacrifice. Semichah is a physical act of taking ownership of one’s own sacrifice and solidifying the connection between the person needing atonement and the vehicle for that atonement. For this reason, the mishnah asserts that one cannot outsource it to others, even those who might usually do things on your behalf.

Read all of Menachot 93 on Sefaria.

This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on April 14, 2026. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.