Tractate Menachot began with this teaching:
All the meal offerings from which a handful was removed, not for their sake, are fit, but these offerings do not satisfy the obligation of the owner.
As with animal sacrifices, the intention of the person performing a meal offering matters. In this instance, we are focused on the intention of the priest as he removes a handful of grain from the rest of the offering. The handful will be sacrificed on the altar; the grain that remains is given to the priests to eat. According to the mishnah, if the person who takes the handful thinks that they are performing a different offering than they actually are (i.e., “not for its own sake”), the offering is fit — meaning it can still be sacrificed and the remainder consumed by priests. However, the sacrifice no longer fulfills the owner’s obligation, and they must bring a new grain offering in order to do so.
Yesterday, the Gemara shared contradictory teachings from Rabbi Shimon. In one, he holds, like the mishnah, that a meal offering which is sacrificed not for its own sake does not fulfill the obligation of the owner. In the other, he says the opposite: that in such a case, the owner’s obligation is fulfilled. That Rabbi Shimon contradicts himself is a problem for the Gemara, and the rabbis search for an explanation. On today’s daf, Rava suggests the following resolution:
Rava said: This is not difficult. Here (in the first teaching), Rabbi Shimon is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a meal offering. There (in the second teaching), he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering.
According to Rava, Rabbi Shimon’s two teachings are not contradictory because they describe two different situations. When a priest removes a handful and has the intention of sacrificing a different kind of meal offering, Rabbi Shimon believes that the owner’s obligation is still fulfilled. When a handful of grain is removed with the erroneous intention that it will accompany an animal offering, however, the owner’s obligation to make this grain offering remains unfulfilled. Did Rabbi Shimon himself share these contexts? No. But if Rava is right, the two teachings are harmonized.
Using a similar argument, Rav Ashi offers a different way to resolve the contradiction between the two statements of Rabbi Shimon:
Rav Ashi said that this is not difficult. Here (in the first teaching), he is referring to a case where one states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan. There (in the second teaching), he states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering.
The distinction Rav Ashi is drawing here is not immediately obvious for a few reasons. First, there is a subtle difference between a pan offering and a deep-pan offering, which are cooked in different implements. But even more confusing, the only distinction Rav Ashi draws is the intention to erroneously offer the handful “for the sake of a deep pan” versus “for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering.” These sound pretty similar, so what is the difference? What Rav Ashi is suggesting is that when the priest has the intention that the handful of grain that he removes will go in the wrong-sized pan, the owner’s obligation can still be fulfilled. However, when the priest errs by intending to offer a sacrifice that requires a regular pan when in reality it requires a deep one (or vice versa), the owner’s obligation is not fulfilled. Just like Rava, Rav Ashi removes the objection that Rabbi Shimon is contradicting himself. Instead, we now understand that he is discussing different situations, each with its own ruling.
Here, a talmudic conversation about the intention of a priest has transformed itself into a conversation about the intention of Rabbi Shimon. In the case of the former, the Talmud explores the possibility that the priest, in the midst of doing his work, may become confused about the particular sacrifice that he is performing or, at least, what implement he should be using. With regard to Rabbi Shimon, however, there is no such supposition. The Gemara does not consider, even for a moment, that he may have been mixed up about the impact of a priest who makes a meal offering with erroneous intention. Citing an error — either on the part of Rabbi Shimon or those who later quoted him — would have been a faster route to resolution. But this is an unusual choice for the Talmud, which takes transmitted teachings seriously and treats an apparent contradiction as something to be resolved, rather than dismissed. Not every sacrifice is valid, but every teaching holds value.
Read all of Menachot 3 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on January 14, 2026. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
