On today’s daf, a new mishnah continues discussing cases of sacrifices that have multiple components, and how invalidation of or improper action with regard to one component may affect the other components of the sacrifice:
The thanksgiving offering renders the accompanying loaves piggul, but the loaves do not render the thanksgiving offering piggul. How so? If one slaughtered the thanksgiving offering with the intent to partake of it the next day, the offering and the accompanying loaves are rendered piggul. If he slaughtered it with the intent to partake of the loaves the next day, the loaves are rendered piggul, and the thanksgiving offering is not piggul.
The todah, or thanksgiving offering, is presented in Leviticus 7. It can only be eaten the day it’s offered and the following night. Crucially, it’s accompanied by 40 loaves of bread — 10 leavened, 30 unleavened. The mishnah here tries to articulate the relationship between the meat and bread components of the sacrifice. If one has improper intent with regard to consumption of the animal offering, this renders both the animal offering and the loaves piggul. But if he has improper intent with regard to consumption of the loaves, this impacts only the loaves, not the animal sacrifice they’re accompanying. Or at the very least, they don’t render it piggul; Rashi states that one who consumes it isn’t liable for karet, which implies that consumption is nonetheless forbidden.
The second clause of our mishnah (not quoted above) lays out a similar rule for the Shavuot offering. Since Shavuot celebrates the wheat harvest, part of its sacrificial procedure is offering two loaves of bread alongside two lambs as peace offerings. In this case, the relationship between the animal offering and the grain is the same as above: While improper intent with regard to consumption of the sheep renders both them and the loaves piggul, improper intent with regard to consumption of the loaves only renders the loaves themselves piggul.
The Gemara examines the logic behind this ruling:
What is the reason? If we say that it is due to that which Rav Kahana says, as Rav Kahana says: From where is it derived that the loaves of a thanksgiving offering are themselves called a thanksgiving offering? It is derived from that which is stated in the verse: “Then he shall offer with the sacrifice of thanks offering loaves” (Leviticus 7:12) — if so, then the opposite should be the halakhah as well!
The Gemara brings us an answer while already priming us to reject it. Perhaps, it suggests, this ruling is due to the fact that the loaves offered with a thanksgiving offering are also called a thanksgiving offering, as taught by Rav Kahana. Therefore, when one has improper intent with regard to the thanksgiving offering (the animal), that could be construed as including the loaves as well. But the Gemara immediately points out a problem: If this is the logic, it should be just as true in reverse! If these loaves and the animal offering go by the same name, why can’t intent with regard to the loaves impact the animal offering?
The Gemara replies:
This is not difficult, as the loaves are called a thanksgiving offering, but a thanksgiving offering is not called loaves.
The relationship does not go both ways. When one thinks about consuming the thanksgiving offering the next day, the main focus is the animal, though that can include the loaves. But when one thinks about consuming the loaves the next day, that implies only the loaves and not the animal.
Seemingly, we’ve actually defended the rationale that the Gemara primed us to reject! However, the Gemara points out a flaw in this logic:
But with regard to that which the mishnah teaches: The lambs sacrificed with the two loaves meal offering on Shavuot render the accompanying loaves piggul, but the loaves do not render the lambs piggul, where do we find that the two loaves are called lambs?
The linguistic argument above — that loaves are called a thanksgiving offering but a thanksgiving offering is not called loaves — works for the ruling in the first clause, but not the second. No one refers to the loaves of the Shavuot offering as “lambs.” Our mishnah juxtaposes these two cases, indicating that their underlying rationale is shared. Therefore, if the rationale above works only for the first clause, it’s insufficient.
The Gemara proposes an alternative solution:
Rather, is it not correct that this is the reason: The bread is brought on account of the thanksgiving offering, but the thanksgiving offering is not brought on account of the bread. Similarly, the two loaves of bread (on Shavuot) are brought on account of the lambs, and the lambs are not brought on account of the bread.
The Gemara’s answer is ultimately very intuitive. This ruling is based on what is considered the primary component of the sacrifice, and what is the ancillary component. In both cases in our mishnah, the animal offering is considered to be the primary component, and the loaves are brought only on the animals’ account. Therefore, things that impact the animal offering impact the loaves, but the relationship is not reciprocal.
It’s worth noting that, though the Gemara rejected the linguistic argument above, it seems to articulate a very similar point. The reason loaves can be referred to as a thanksgiving offering but a thanksgiving offering can’t be referred to as loaves is seemingly because of the logic articulated above: The animal is the essential component of the thanksgiving offering, and the loaves are an accompaniment. Therefore, our two rationales — both the rejected and the accepted — ultimately propose very similar solutions. Just another day in the thick of talmudic argumentation.
Read all of Menachot 15 on Sefaria.
This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on January 26, 2026. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.
