Chullin 111

Today’s daf contains a discussion of kashrut relevant to contemporary practice in any kitchen that contains both meat and dairy:

It was stated: If a fish was placed hot in a meat bowl, Rav says: It is prohibited to eat the fish with the milk dish kutah. And Shmuel says: It is permitted to eat the fish with kutah.

Rav says that it is prohibited to eat the fish with kutah because this is a case of imparted flavor. And Shmuel says that it is permitted because this is a case of imparted flavor derived from imparted flavor.

The meaning of the initial statement is contested: Some say it refers specifically to fish (or any other pareve food) that was placed, while hot, into a clean bowl previously used for meat. Others say it refers to fish (or other pareve food) that was cooked in a clean pan previously used for meat. 

Rav, who is more strict, says it’s forbidden to eat this fish with kutah, a dairy Babylonian dish akin to cottage cheese, because the fish has absorbed the meat flavor and will transfer it to the kutah. Shmuel argues that it is permissible to eat the fish with kutah, because this is a case of notein tam bar notein tam — imparted flavor derived from imparted flavor. If the fish had been cooked directly with meat itself, then everyone would agree it has fleishig (meat) status and cannot be eaten with dairy foods. But in this case, the meat first imparted flavor to the bowl or pot, which then imparted flavor to the fish, which would only then impart flavor to the kutah. Shmuel’s view is that the flavor has, at this point, been so diminished that it no longer has legal significance.

The Gemara investigates how the two arrive at their positions. It suggests that Rav never taught this explicitly. Instead, his position is inferred from an incident in which people prepared eye ointment in a bowl, then later served him fish in the same bowl, and he found there was a strong ointment flavor in his fish. But this is dismissed as proof of his position, because it’s possible that ointment flavor is significantly more pungent than meat. The Gemara then offers another story to demonstrate Rav’s position:

Rabbi Elazar (a student of Rav) was standing before Mar Shmuel, and they brought before Shmuel a fish that had been removed directly from the fire and placed into a bowl used previously for meat. Shmuel ate it together with kutah. Shmuel then gave Rabbi Elazar some of this dish, but Rabbi Elazar did not eat it. Shmuel said to him: To your teacher, Rav, I gave this dish and he ate from it, yet you will not eat? Later, Rabbi Elazar came before Rav, and said to him: Did the master (you) retract this halakhah? Rav said to him: God forbid that the progeny of Abba bar Abba (Shmuel) would feed me something that I do not hold to be permitted.

We see that Rabbi Elazar, in accordance with his teacher, refuses to eat hot fish placed in a clean meat bowl with dairy food. Though Shmuel suggests Rav himself would eat such food, Rav later clarifies that he still maintains eating such a fish with dairy would be prohibited. 

The Gemara goes on to relay a story of two rabbis who sit on a riverbank. One of them eats fish in a clean fleishig bowl with kutah. The other, astonished, demands, “Would your teacher do this?!” The one who ate the fish replies that he holds in accordance with Shmuel.

Shmuel’s position is treated as surprising and non-normative in that story. Indeed, Rav generally “wins” against Shmuel when they disagree in matters of prohibitions. So we might expect the Gemara to ultimately side with Rav’s position. And yet, at the end of the sugya, we find the opposite:

Hizkiyya says in the name of Abaye: The halakhah is: If a fish was removed from the fire and placed into a bowl used for meat, it is permitted to eat it together with kutah.

In the end, we rule like Shmuel, and hold that notein tam bar notein tam (imparted flavor from imparted flavor) is permitted.

Of course, halakhically, that is not the end of the story, because what exactly this means is debated by later authorities. The most permissive view is that a person may intentionally cook pareve food in a clean fleishig pot and then eat it with a dairy meal. The next most permissive is that a person should not plan to do this, but if the pareve food was already cooked in the meat-designated pot for another purpose, it can be eaten with a dairy meal. The more strict opinion, adopted by many Ashkenazim, is that pareve food cooked in a meat vessel can never be eaten directly with dairy, but if hot pareve food is placed on a meat vessel, it can indeed be consumed directly with dairy. Even the strict opinion holds that this pareve food could be consumed with a dairy meal, but if it was cooked directly in a meat vessel, it has to be eaten with separate utensils.

All of this is eminently relevant for those cooking in meat and dairy kitchens, both in terms of deciding how to prepare food — say, a challah that you made for a meat meal but would love to also eat with dairy the next morning — and in terms of deciding after the fact whether or not something has been rendered prohibited.

Read all of Chullin 111 on Sefaria.

This piece originally appeared in a My Jewish Learning Daf Yomi email newsletter sent on August 19, 2026. If you are interested in receiving the newsletter, sign up here.