Ariel Sharon and the Messianism of Force

The legacy of a warrior and Prime Minister.

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Building and Dismantling Settlements

Sharon believed to the end in the primacy of force. What changed, and brought about his stunning withdrawal from Gaza, was his net assessment of Israel's security threats as primarily demographic and, secondarily, everything else. Sharon pursued the destruction of the Jewish presence in Gaza with the same relentlessness with which he had subdued its Palestinian residents in the late 1960s and built its Jewish settlements in the decades since.

The settler groups that were glad to follow the National Bulldozer when it followed their preferred path were horrified to see it reverse course and bear down on them. Sharon was, in the course of the disengagement, as dismissive of democratic practice as ever. After announcing the initiative he simply returned to his ranch, emerging occasionally to reward his friends and punish his enemies. In the end he executed the task with lightning speed and breathtaking tactical success and did more to undo the settlement project than all the leftists in the world.

I Am the State

Sharon's forcefulness was part of his personality, of course, but it flourished as part of a national ethos. He embodied the forcefulness of the 1948 Generation, raised on and tied to the land, for whom the involved ideological debates of their parents--and of their tactical allies among the settlers--were foreign abstractions. Sharon was and remained a member of MAPAI, the party created in that Labor Zionist image, devoid of ideological romance and focused on the practical. Yet Sharon was able to navigate the post-1977 populist tides that swept MAPAI out to sea.

He gave new meaning to L'etat cest moi (I am the state). One was regularly left thunderstruck by Sharon's belief in his own righteousness, as evinced in his lawsuit against Time magazine in 1983 and his willingness to be humbled but not sidelined by the Kahan Commission that found him indirectly responsible for the massacres at Sabra and Shatila.

It was unclear if Lebanon taught him anything about the limits of force as a means of redrawing the map of the Arab world. The Gaza disengagement showed that he had learned the limits of physical force as an instrument of controlling the Palestinians. As with Rabin and Barak so too with him, it was precisely his lack of sentimentality about a "new Middle East," that made him the likeliest peacemaker around.

Sharon became, at the end, the representative and leader of Middle Israel, the broad pragmatic center which seeks to leave the territories--in part on moral grounds, in part out of enlightened self-interest--and believes, reasonably, that peace is at best a distant longing, while the most to be hoped for in the near-to-middle term is some rough coexistence. And if even that is unattainable, we must redraw the borders of the state to be better prepared, internally and externally, for the conflicts ahead.

With Sharon's unilateral departure from Gaza, the last of the three false messianisms ran onto the shoals, leaving Israel to try and find some workable mixture of force, good intentions and, yes, faith.

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Yehudah Mirsky

Yehudah Mirsky, a former US State Department official, lives in Jerusalem and is a Fellow at the Van Leer Institute and Harvard.