The Fetus in Jewish Law
Does a fetus have the same legal status as a person?
By Fred Rosner
Reprinted with permission from Biomedical Ethics and
Jewish Law, published by KTAV.
An unborn fetus in Jewish law is not considered a person
(Heb. nefesh, lit. “soul”) until it
has been born. The fetus is regarded as a part of the mother’s body and not a
separate being until it begins to egress from the womb during parturition
(childbirth). In fact, until forty days after conception, the fertilized egg is
considered as “mere fluid.” These facts form the basis for the Jewish legal
view on abortion. Biblical, talmudic, and rabbinic support for these statements
will now be presented.
Intentional abortion is not
mentioned directly in the Bible, but a case of accidental abortion is discussed
in Exodus 21:22‑23, where Scripture states: “When men fight and one of
them pushes a pregnant woman and a miscarriage results, but no other misfortune
ensues, the one responsible shall be fined as the woman’s husband may exact
from him, the payment to be based on judges’ reckoning. But if other misfortune
ensues, the penalty shall be life for life.”
The famous medieval biblical commentator Solomon ben
Isaac, known as Rashi, interprets “no other misfortune” to mean no fatal injury
to the woman following her miscarriage. In that case, the attacker pays only
financial compensation for having unintentionally caused the miscarriage, no
differently than if he had accidentally injured the woman elsewhere on her
body. Most other Jewish Bible commentators, including Moses Nachmanides
(Ramban), Abraham Ibn Ezra, Meir Leib ben Yechiel Michael (Malbim), Baruch
Malawi Epstein (Torah Temimah), Samson Raphael Hirsch, Joseph Hertz, and
others, agree with Rashi’s interpretation. We can thus conclude that when the
mother is otherwise unharmed following trauma to her abdomen during which the
fetus is lost, the only rabbinic concern is to have the one responsible pay
damages to the woman and her husband for the loss of the fetus. None of the
rabbis raise the possibility of involuntary manslaughter being involved because
the unborn fetus is not legally a person and, therefore, there is no question
of murder involved when a fetus is aborted.
Based upon this biblical
statement. Moses Maimonides asserts as follows: “If one assaults a woman, even
unintentionally, and her child is born prematurely, he must pay the value of
the child to the husband and the compensation for injury and pain to the
woman.” Maimonides continues with statements regarding how these compensations
are computed. A similar declaration is found in Joseph Karo’s legal code
Shulkhan Aruch. No concern is expressed by either Maimonides or Karo regarding
the status of the miscarried fetus. It is part of the mother and belongs
jointly to her and her husband, and thus damages must be paid for its premature
death. However, the one who was responsible is not culpable for murder, since
the unborn fetus is not considered a person.
Murder in Jewish law is based upon Exodus 21:12, where it
is written: “He that smiteth a man so that he dieth shall surely be put to
death.” The word “man” is interpreted by the sages to mean a man but not a
fetus. Thus, the destruction of an unborn fetus is not considered murder.
Another pertinent scriptural passage is Leviticus 24:17,
where it states: “And he that smiteth any person mortally shall surely be put
to death.” However, an unborn fetus is not considered a person or nefesh and, therefore, its destruction
does not incur the death penalty.
Turning to talmudic sources, the Mishnah asserts the following:
“If a woman is having difficulty in giving birth [and her life is in danger],
one cuts up the fetus within her womb and extracts it limb by limb, because her
life takes precedence over that of the fetus. But if the greater part was
already born, one may not touch it, for one may not set aside one person’s life
for that of another.”
Rabbi Yom tov Lippman Heller,
known as Tosafot Yom Tov, in his commentary on this passage in the Mishnah,
explains that the fetus is not considered a nefesh
until it has egressed into the air of the world and, therefore, one is
permitted to destroy it to save the mother’s life. Similar reasoning is found
in Rashi’s commentary on the talmudic discussion of this mishnaic passage,
where Rashi states that as long as the child has not come out into the world,
it is not called a living being, i.e., nefesh.
Once the head of the child has come out, the child may not be harmed because it
is considered as fully born, and one life may not be taken to save another.
The
Mishnah elsewhere states: “If a pregnant woman is taken out to be executed, one
does not wait for her to give birth; but if her pains of parturition have
already begun [lit. she has already sat on the birth stool], one waits for her
until she gives birth.” One does not delay the execution of the mother in order
to save the life of the fetus because the fetus is not yet a person (Heb. nefesh), and judgments in Judaism must
be promptly implemented. The Talmud also explains that the embryo is part of
the mother’s body and has no identity of its own, since it is dependent for its
life upon the body of the woman. However, as soon as it starts to move from the
womb, it is considered an autonomous being (nefesh)
and thus unaffected by the mother’s state. This concept of the embryo being
considered part of the mother and not a separate being recurs throughout the
Talmud and rabbinic writings.
Dr. Fred Rosner is a professor of medicine at Mount Sinai School of
Medicine. A prolific writer, he has published 36 books and over 800 articles.
Dr. Rosner is listed in Who’s Who in America and Who’s Who in World Jewry.