The Second
Intifada Continues
What happened and
why?
By Ziv Hellman
This article, the second in a two-part series, examines
the roots of the second Intifada and the implications for Palestinians and
Israelis. Click
here for the first part of the series.
As the
second Intifada progressed, it resembled the first Intifada less and less,
taking on the characteristics of armed guerilla fighting, similar in some ways
to the tactics adopted by Hezbollah in Lebanon during its fighting against
Israeli forces. Some analysts believe that this was not a coincidence.
The Lebanon Precedent
The
Israel Defense Forces unilaterally withdrew from its positions in Lebanon in
May 2000 after suffering years of bloody guerilla blows from Hezbollah. Some
scholars have suggested that this was interpreted in most of the Arab world as
a new precedent, the first time that the Israeli army was forced to concede
defeat in the face of Arab military tenacity, and as proof that Israeli society
was weakening in its resolve to accept casualties. Hezbollah fighters were
considered heroes in Arab homes, and Palestinian militias invited Hezbollah
experts to provide them with training in proven tactics against the Israel
Defense Forces.
In
numerous interviews with journalists, Palestinian leaders have indicated that
the Lebanon precedent sparked a hope among them that similar armed pressure on
Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would lead to a demoralized Israeli
withdrawal and dismantling of settlements, enabling the Palestinians to achieve
more than they might in negotiations. For example, Marwan Barghouti--a
high-ranking Fatah (Palestine Liberation Organization) official in the West
Bank prior to his arrest by Israeli armed forces in April 2002--frequently told
reporters that the Palestinians ought to continue the Intifada even if
Palestinian-Israeli negotiations were to resume, stating that the only way to end the Intifada is for
Israel to withdraw from the West Bank, just as it had from Lebanon.
Islamic Fundamentalism and September 11th
The
names by which the conflict that has raged since September 2000 has been called
are instructive. In Israel there were attempts early on by some commentators to
label it "the
Oslo war" or "the war against peace," but the general public
mostly avoided those names because of they smacked of political connotations,
blaming the supporters of the Oslo agreements for the terror attacks within
Israel.
Most Israelis simply
called it 'the Intifada' or increasingly--as time went on and a grim atmosphere
settled on the-- 'the matzav,' which literally means 'the situation,' as
if it was all just a temporary condition they had the bad luck to be
experiencing and which might soon be over.
For the Palestinian
side it has consistently been the 'Al-Aksa Intifada,' after the name of the
famous mosque, since the first day of clashes on the Temple Mount. This has had
the effect of giving the struggle a religious dimension; had it been called the
Independence Intifada or even the Jerusalem Intifada the implication would be
more political than religious. The religious aspect has special significance in
the context of Palestinian political history, because the PLO in its early
years was dominated by secular and leftist-oriented organizations, with
religious militias such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad appearing later on the
scene. Initially the Islamic militias served as an opposition to the PLO, with
their stress upon Islam over and above the need for a Palestinian state.
The second Intifada
brought about a unity of Palestinian factions, with Fatah, a secular branch of
Arafat loyalists, and even the Marxist People's Front for the Liberation of
Palestine joining forces with the most rigid of Islamic fundamentalists in
attacking Israeli targets.
Religious Aspects of the Second Intifada
In fact, the religious
aspects came to dominate the second Intifada, from its Arabic name to the
emphasis on suicide bombing attacks, which were initially conducted solely by
fervent Islamic believers willing to be religious 'shuhada' (martyrs)
but were adopted by all the Palestinian factions when becoming a shahid
(martyr) for Palestine became an ideal to strive for throughout Palestinian
society.
However, some of these
violent tactics may have resulted in increased sympathy for Israel and
Israelis. The images of Israeli civilians--including many children--blown apart
by Palestinian suicide bombers brought Israel some sympathy in the American
press. When a muscular form of Islamic fundamentalism brought about the suicide
airplane attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in
Washington on September 11, 2001, the Palestinian militias found themselves
frequently identified by an enraged U.S. administration as being part of the
Islamic terrorist international movement.
There has been no
evidence of direct connections between Al Qaeda and Palestinian movements,
despite some limited Al Qaeda attempts to set up cells in the Gaza Strip.
Israel's Likud-led government, however, pointed to Iraqi, Iranian, and Saudi
support for various Palestinian factions and the general atmosphere of Islamic
terrorism cultivated in Palestinian society to draw parallels between Israel's
struggle against Palestinian terrorism and the international fight against Al
Qaeda. After an extremely bloody series of suicide bomb attacks in the spring
of 2002 culminated in a massacre of Passover celebrators in the coastal city
Netanya--among them many elderly Holocaust survivors--the Israel Defense Forces
(IDF) proceeded to enter all the Palestinian territories in an attempt to crush
the Intifada.
A year earlier, a
24-hour incursion of the IDF into the Gaza Strip led to such international
condemnation that Israel quickly withdrew out of fear that an aggressive move
on its part could lead to international intervention. In contrast, the IDF's
Operation 'Defensive Shield' in 2002 was subject to minor criticism given the
new international atmosphere regarding the war on terrorism.
The Violence Continues
Even the Palestinian
attempt to tar Israel with accusations it massacred civilians in the West Bank
town of Jenin at the height of that operation failed. International researchers
eventually concluded that the Israeli version, according to which only about 50
armed Palestinians had been killed in fierce fighting that also cost the lives
of 23 Israelis, was true--as opposed to the Palestinian claim that up to 500
civilians had been slaughtered by Israeli forces. While there are varying accounts
on the exact number of Palestinians killed in the fighting there, they are all
in the range of about 50 to 56. All observers agree most of them were armed
combatants.
In the early spring of
2003, the second Intifada, while far from ending, appeared to have entered a
period of relative remission, with Israelis enjoying two months without a
single suicide bombing. Many Israelis credited the relentless IDF actions for
this period of quiet in Israel. Yet a bus bombing in Haifa in the afternoon of
March 5, 2003, took the lives of 15 Israeli civilians, wounding 30 more. This
came on the heals of intensive IDF operations in the Gaza Strip in which a
chief Hamas operative was nabbed, but also more than 20 Palestinian
civilians--among them a pregnant woman 10 days away from her due date--were
killed. The region seems to be as mired in violence as ever.
This second Intifada
appears to have achieved little of substance for the Palestinians. Israel has
certainly been hurt on numerous levels, with its economy suffering, it tourism
industry brought to a halt, its image in Europe tarnished, and hundreds of
civilian casualties suffered. But at the same time the Palestinian economy has
been shattered close to the point of non-existence and Palestinian casualties number
in the thousands. Not one Israeli settlement has been removed or relocated
after two and a half years of armed conflict, but what had been an autonomous
Palestinian entity in the West Bank has all but disappeared in the face of a
renewed Israeli occupation, with Israeli troops patrolling Palestinian towns at
will. Palestinian leaders are no longer welcome in Washington, D.C., and are
instead mentioned by American officials as potentially subject to 'regime
change.'
As the violence has
continued with the dream of an independent Palestinian state becoming all the
more distant, there has been some questioning by some Palestinian leaders--most
notably Abu Mazan--of the wisdom of armed conflict. And Palestinian leaders
Sari Nussibeh and Hanan Ashwari published a petition with 500 signatories
denouncing the suicide bombing on practical rather than moral grounds. However,
an honest and widespread public reckoning of where the second Intifada is
headed and what goals are in Palestinian society does not yet appeared to have
occurred.
Ziv Hellman is a Jerusalem-based writer and
mathematician. A former editor at the Jerusalem Post, Ziv was founding member of Peace Watch--the watchdog group
reporting on the implementation of the Oslo Agreements. He also led the Israeli
elections observer team evaluating the Palestinian Authority elections.